

The Art and Science of Diplomacy - Analyzing International Negotiations Syllabus

02 September 2013

1 Description

International politics is characterized by a fundamental trade-off. While states can often gain from cooperation, the distribution of the gains from cooperation causes conflicts. Negotiations are an important element of international politics when it comes to settle these conflicts. However, while negotiations sometimes lead to very successful agreements others are never concluded. In this class we will introduce several analytical tools and theoretical approaches which help to understand international negotiations both in terms of actors' strategies and negotiation outcomes. Major focus of the theoretical analysis are i) institutional and procedural aspects of negotiations, ii) the interconnectedness of the international and national level, and iii) the role of negotiators and their strategic incentives. We will use the analytical tools to assess several current and historical examples of international negotiations. A good working knowledge of math is a prerequisite for understanding the game-theoretical models we cover in class.

2 Organizational Stuff

Date

Monday, 3.30-5pm

Room: A5,6 B317

Starts: 02 September 2013

Ends: 02 December 2013

Contact

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Office hours: Tuesday, 5.15-6.30pm and on appointment.

Performance requirements

In order to earn the 5 ECTS credits you have to meet the following performance requirements:

1. *Regular active participation:* Attendance is mandatory. In case of sickness–or other *important* reasons for non-attendance–I expect you to excuse yourselves *before* the class starts. An email is enough. I expect you to do the readings and to bring a *hardcopy* of the reading(s) to class as we will work with the articles. In case that you miss a class I expect you to hand in a two page summary of the readings.
2. *Exposé:* I expect you to hand in a one to two page Exposé on **21 October 2013**. You hand it in by uploading the file on ilias. The Exposé should clearly state your research question of your term paper and give a brief overview about how you intend to tackle it. You will receive feedback on your Exposé including the approval of the topic or a call to my office hours to further discuss your topic.
3. *Poster:* Toward the end of the semester (**18 November 2013**) we will have a poster session where you present your term paper in poster format. This provides the opportunity to clarify your topic and to receive peer feedback. It also helps to fix issues with the paper and discuss problems or questions. You are expected to upload the poster to ilias on Friday, 15 November 2013. More details will be provided later during the semester.
4. *Discussant:* During the Seminar you will have two discussant jobs. Firstly, you will write a one page comment on an Exposé of one of your classmates. This is due on 25 October 2013. Secondly, you will write a one page comment on one of your classmates

poster. This is due on 18 November 2013. You upload the comments in ilias. The pairing will be done close to the respective deadline.

5. *Term paper*: The term paper should be 12-15 pages long and is to be written in English. The deadline for the term paper is **02 December 2013**. I expect to receive the paper by email (as a *pdf!*) before midnight that day. You also have to hand in a printed version which *has to include the signed declaration!* The print version can be handed in at the secretariat of the chair until the end of the following week (13 December 2013). Thematically, I expect you to pick an international negotiation and analyze it with the help of one of the theories we cover in class. The topic needs my approval. I strongly advise you to come to my office hours to discuss the topic.
6. *Names*: Experience tells me that I have to mention this: Whenever you hand an assignment in, make sure to state your name in the document!!!

Final grade

The final grade is a weighted average of the term paper (70%) and the poster presentation (20%) and your comments (10%).

3 General Literature

This is a list of books which I recommend for further reading if you are interested in the topic. I do not expect you to have read all of this.

Barston, Ronald P. 2013. *Modern Diplomacy*. Harlow: Pearson. 4. ed.

Berridge, Geoff. 2010. *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 4. ed.

Fisher, Roger, und William L. Ury. 2003. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in*. 2. ed. Random House UK.

Iklé, Fred C. 1968. *How Nations Negotiate*. 2. ed. Santa Barbara: Praeger University Series

Kremenyuk, Victor A. 2002. *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*. 2. ed. John Wiley & Sons.

Raiffa, Howard. 1982. *The Art and Science of Negotiation*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press.

Raiffa, Howard, John Richardson, und David Metcalfe. 2007. *Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making*. Cambridge Massachusetts: The Belknap Press.

Thomson, Robert/Stokman, Frans N./Achen, Christopher H./König, Thomas (Hrsg.). 2006. *The European Union Decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, Leigh L. 2009. *The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator*. London: Pearson.

United Nations. 2011. *Manual for UN Delegates: Conference Process, Procedure and Negotiation*. New York: United Nations.

Ury, William. 1991. *Getting Past No: Negotiating in Difficult Situations*. New York: Random House.

Zartman, William I./Berman, Maureen 2009. *The Practical Negotiator*. Yale University Press, New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. ed.

4 Sessions and Readings

Session 1: Introduction and organizational stuff (02.09.2013)

Session 2: Overview (09.09.2013)

Why do states negotiate? How can we think about negotiations analytically? Which aspects of negotiations deserve close inspection?

Barston, Ronald P. 2013. *Modern Diplomacy*. Harlow: Pearson. 4. ed. *Chapter 4: Negotiation*. pages 51–72.

Iklé, Fred C. 1968. *How Nations Negotiate*. Santa Barbara: Praeger University Series. Kapitel 3: *Five Objectives*. Seite 26–42.

Raiffa, Howard. 1982. *The Art and Science of Negotiation*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. Chapter 2: *Some Organizing Questions*. Seite 11–19.

recommended readings:

Hopmann, Terence D. 1995. Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 542:24–47.

Odell, John S. 2010. *Three islands of knowledge about negotiation in international organizations*. *Journal of European Public Policy* 17(5):619–632.

Session 3: The cooperation problem (16.09.2013)

What distinguishes negotiations at the international and national level? What is the general setting in which international negotiations take place? How do cooperation problems affect bargaining?

Fearon, James D. 1998. *Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation*. *International Organization* 52(2):269–305.

Martin, Lisa L. 1992. *Interests, Power, and Multilateralism*. *International Organization* 46(4):765–792.

Recommended Readings:

Axelrod, Robert/Keohane, Robert O. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. *World Politics* 38(1):226–254

Session 4: International Negotiations: Basic principles (23.09.2013)

How are diplomatic interactions structured? Which phases do negotiations follow? What are the macro patterns?

Berridge, Geoff. 2010. *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 4. ed. *Part I: The Art of Negotiation*. pages 25–100.

Session 5: Bargaining I - Introduction to fundamental concepts (30.09.2013)

What is bargaining? How does it differ from negotiation? What determines power in a bargaining situation? Which factors influence the micro patterns of bargaining?

Fisher, Roger, und William L. Ury. 2003. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in*. 2. ed. Random House UK. Chapter 6: *What if they are more powerful?*. pages 101–111.

Muthoo, Abhinav. 2000. *A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory*. *World Economics* 1(2): 145–166.

Session 6: Bargaining II: The Nash Bargaining Solution (07.10.2013)

How can we mathematically analyze bargaining outcomes? What properties should bargaining outcomes have? How can we apply Nash's axiomatic approach to real world phenomena?

Osborne, Martin J. 2003. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 16: *Bargaining*. pages 481–488.

Powell, Robert. 2002. *Bargaining Theory and International Conflict*. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:1–30.

Session 7: Bargaining III: Alternating Offer Bargaining (14.10.2013)

How can we add structure to the process of bargaining? How do preferences influence the process? How is coalition building influenced by preferences and the bargaining environment?

Baron, David/Ferejohn, John. 1989. *Bargaining in Legislatures*. *American Political Science Review* 83(4):1181–1206.

Osborne, Martin J. 2003. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 16: *Bargaining*. pages 465–492.

Session 8: Putnam and the Schelling Conjecture (21.10.2013)

Why does the paradox of weakness (Schelling) work? How can we translate this principle into state interaction?

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*. *International Organization* 42(3): 427–460.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 2: *An Essay on Bargaining*. pages 21–52.

Session 9: More on Bargaining Outcomes: International Treaties (28.10.2013)

What forms can outcomes of international negotiations assume? How do states choose the degree of formalization of bargaining outcomes?

Barston, Ronald P. 2013. *Modern Diplomacy*. Harlow: Pearson. 4. ed. *Chapter 17: International Treaties*. pages 349–384.

Lipson, Charles. 1991. Why are some international agreements informal?. *International Organization* 45(4):495–538.

Session 10: More on Bargaining Tactics (04.11.2013)

How can we understand the tactical moves which actors make? Which moves work best? How do the actor characteristics influence the choice of tactics?

Dür, Andreas/Gemma Mateo. 2010. Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU's Financial Perspective, 2007–13. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(3):557–578.

Sebenius, James K. 1983. Negotiation arithmetic: Adding and subtracting issues and parties. *International Organization* 37(2):281–316.

Session 11: Managing Conflicts: Arbitration (11.11.2013)

Why do states sometimes choose to settle conflicts by arbitration if negotiations fail? When is arbitration successful?

Allee, Todd L./Huth, Paul K. 2006. *Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover*. *American Political Science Review* 100(2):219–234.

Gent, Stephen E./Shannon, Megan. 2010. *The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting into a Bind*. *The Journal of Politics* 72(2):366–380.

Session 12: Poster Session (18.11.2013)

Session 13: Negotiations in the European Union (25.11.2013)

How are international negotiations institutionalized? How does the institutionalization affect bargaining environments and outcomes?

Tallberg, Jonas. 2006. *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. *Chapters 4+5*. pages: 82–140.

Session 14: Buffer Session (02.12.2013)